Less than two months ago, PANL had fallen below $25 a share – down sharply from the $63 peak it achieved this spring – on fears about a crucial contract used by Wall Street to assess the potential value of the company. PANL had by then spent more than a year simply extending its original contract with Samsung, its largest commercial customer by far, collecting royalty payments for use of patented technology that ranks as the smaller company’s primary asset. While Goldman Sachs and other bullish followers of the stock widely expected a jump in that royalty rate under a renegotiated deal, however, PANL ultimately revealed that the company would no longer receive royalty payments from the giant cell phone maker at all.
PANL nevertheless soared 85% the week the company announced that new long-term agreement, adding $1 billion to its market value in the span of five short days, with analysts mistakenly assuming that PANL would continue to receive royalty payments – but at an even higher rate – until the company itself ultimately proved them wrong. According to a heavily redacted version of that important contract, stripped free of any financials terms that would expose the true value of the deal, PANL will receive a mere “license fee” from Samsung – rather than royalties based on actual sales of products using its patented technology – and (unspecified) revenue from chemical sales to the giant electronics company going forward.
In other words, that contract indicates, PANL may never capitalize on the popularity of Samsung smart phones featuring the Organic Light Emitting Diode (OLED) technology that has long been viewed as the key to its own future success.
“While terms were omitted, it is clear that the Samsung deal is a license agreement” and not a royalty-based agreement, Canaccord Genuity analyst Jonathan Dorsheimer conceded after PANL finally released an actual contract that reversed his earlier view. “Details are limited and are being kept to few senior executives at both SMD (Samsung Mobile Display) and UDC (Universal Display Corporation). Both parties believe they prevailed in the terms of the agreement, none of which where disclosed in the 8K” that included the heavily redacted contract.
PANL failed to answer questions for this story.
Notably, records indicate, PANL suffered a major legal setback that could have seriously weakened its own negotiating power – while bolstering that held by Samsung – when the two parties hammered out the terms of that long-delayed agreement. Back in late March, records show, the Japanese Patent Office invalidated all of the claims covered under two important PANL patents that had previously protected the company’s OLED technology and required Samsung to pay royalties based on sales of its OLED-enabled devices. While PANL escaped an immediate hit on that overlooked court ruling, with the stock actually soaring to a record high above $63 a share the very next week, it began to spiral lower after The Korea Times – an English-language newspaper in the country where Samsung is based – stepped forward to publicize the development.
Barely a month after that foreign newspaper article appeared, gradually catching the attention of PANL bears in the weeks that followed, the stock had fallen to just half the record price that it had boasted in the spring. PANL continued to lose ground throughout most of the summer, sinking below $25 in early August, but the stock suddenly began to reverse course as the company finally neared the end of its drawn-out negotiations with Samsung.
PANL soared 24% to almost $35 a share the day before the company even announced that new agreement, a striking jump on massive volume that would soon raise eyebrows at CNBC, and then rocketed straight past $40 on official news of the long-awaited deal. Although Wall Street rushed to celebrate that vague announcement as a big victory for PANL, however, The Korea Times took the opposite stand by portraying Samsung as the likely winner – poised to save “millions of dollars” in royalty fees – under that new contract instead.
“The developments could allow firms based in Asia, such as Samsung and LG, to manufacture OLEDs,” one fund manager stated in the article, “without having to pay royalties to UDC for materials used.”
With bullish analysts here in the U.S. clearly drowning out that faraway newspaper in the country that Samsung calls home, however, PANL saw its market value explode past $2 billion – almost doubling in size over the course of one short week – before the company even released the actual contract that sparked that breathtaking rally in its shares. The stock barely paused while investors tried to evaluate that heavily redacted contract, a real (if not impossible) challenge due to the complete absence of key financial terms, before taking off and ultimately breaking past the $60 mark once again.
PANL insiders have capitalized on that surge with lucrative stock sales, banking $9.5 million since the company first announced its new contract with Samsung five short weeks ago. More than half a dozen insiders sold stock during that period, records show, with three key members of the senior management team – the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer and the chief technology officer – scoring hefty seven-figure gains that accounted for the majority of those impressive proceeds.
If PANL has in fact granted only “a few senior executives” access to the crucial details of its new contract with Samsung, as Canaccord clearly indicated last month, those three officers look to many like the most obvious candidates for inclusion in that select group. With the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission reportedly examining the redacted version of that agreement, however, PANL could find itself unable to conceal the financial terms of that new contract under confidentiality measures – intended to block competitors, rather than investors, from sensitive material – for very long.
The Alliance for Economic Stability (AES), a nonprofit organization focused on addressing potential abuses of securities laws, recently sent the SEC a detailed analysis – highlighting notable changes between the original royalty-based contract and the new licensing agreement -- that suggests the need for a thorough review. In essence, the AES claims, PANL has blatantly exploited loopholes in SEC disclosure policies by withholding the very information that investors need to determine the true value of the company.
“This redaction makes impossible an evaluation of the 2011 agreement or a determination of PANL’s position vis-à-vis its competitors,” the AES states in a seven-page letter sent to the SEC Division of Corporate Finance about a week ago. “It appears, however, that rather than reflecting an extraordinary and unexpected positive development, as PANL has led the investment community to believe by way of the redacted filing, the 2011 agreement represents a substantial deterioration in PANL’s relationship with Samsung and its OLED business generally …
“We respectfully suggest that the legal deficiencies in PANL’s disclosures, PANL’s seeming deceptiveness and the evident confusion in the marketplace mandate that PANL be required to disclose the complete and unredacted OLED patent license agreements between it and Samsung,” the AES declares. “We believe that requiring such disclosure would be consistent with the division’s role of ensuring that investors are provided with material information to assist them in making informed decisions and setting a fair and reasonable price for PANL’s stock.”
For now, even after a notable slide last week, PANL continues to enjoy an incredibly rich premium based on expectations for explosive future growth. The market currently values PANL at $2.18 billion, a whopping 57 times its prior-year sales, even though the company has kept the financial terms of its most important contract – and the key driver of its stock – completely hidden away from public view.
Over the course of its 15-year history, records show, PANL has accumulated a staggering $225 million deficit while failing to report a single annual profit at all. Nevertheless, PANL has long commanded a generous stock price (based upon traditional measures) because of high hopes for its future success.
PANL first debuted as a public company in the mid-1990s, records show, when it merged with an inactive shell and carried out a stock offering to supplement the $40 previously held in its barren bank account. Even then – as a young company with just eight employees (three of them part-time) – PANL was already touting the potential value of its future OLED technology. PANL had yet to launch any real operating activities at that point, however, and saw little chance of generating any revenue until the company could successfully test -- and ultimately commercialize -- the patented technology that would become its primary asset.
After a few short years, with PANL still relying on research contracts for all of its meager revenue, the company had nevertheless achieved a double-digit price for its stock and a listing on the largest Nasdaq exchange. By early 2000 (a full year before PANL even joined forces with Samsung), records show, PANL already boasted a market value of half-a-billion dollars – a full 100 times the company’s paltry $500,000 in annual sales.
PANL inked its original deal with Samsung in the fall of 2001, records show, when the two parties signed a joint-venture agreement to develop OLED-enabled display screens using the smaller company’s patented technology. PANL and Samsung then cemented that relationship in the spring of 2005, records show, with the important commercial contract that expired in the middle of last year.
Under the terms of that original royalty-based deal, records indicate, PANL would receive a certain percentage of the revenue generated from the sale of Samsung devices featuring its patented OLED technology. With Samsung ranking as the largest manufacturer of OLED-enabled display screens on the planet – and PANL set to collect even a tiny portion (estimated below 1%) of those OLED-related sales -- the smaller company finally looked poised for future success. By relying on Samsung as the primary user of its core technology, however, PANL had largely tied its entire fate to that important relationship as well.
To be sure, records indicate, PANL tried to broaden its customer base (and minimize that concentrated risk) by pitching its OLED technology to other giant electronics companies as well. However, despite smaller deals with some major companies -- including Sony (NYSE: SNE), LG Display (NYSE: LPL) and Pioneer – PANL has so far yet to land another contract that can even compare with the Samsung agreement responsible for generating an estimated 70% (or more) of its commercial sales.
Nevertheless, by early 2007, PANL was already predicting that its OLED-related business would soon become quite lucrative indeed.
Years later, however, PANL continued to lose money and remained saddled with negative operating and profit margins (of -20% and -54% respectively) instead. During 2010, easily its best full year on record, PANL virtually doubled its annual revenue to $30.5 million – with the help of record commercial sales – but the company still wound up losing almost $20 million in the end. PANL saw its overhead expenses rise by about 20% during that period, records show, with the costs of maintaining and protecting its patents in court (already measured in the millions) growing at a much faster clip.
PANL faces multiple challenges to those patents, including several cases in Asia, where the company generates more than 80% of its commercial revenue. PANL has already lost one major case in Japan, records show, and still faces additional challenges both there and in Korea (plus another two in Europe) as well.
Contrary to popular belief, records show, two different companies – Eastman Kodak (NYSE: EK) and a division of Sumitomo – developed their own OLED technologies years before PANL ever arrived on the scene. Since then, records show, some of PANL’s own commercial customers have gone on to develop new OLED technologies as well. Meanwhile, just last week, the venture capital arm of Samsung – PANL’s most important customer of all – announced that it had taken an equity stake in another company, German-based Novaled, that ranks as a major player in the OLED arena.
“Our investment in Novaled is consistent with our strategy to work closely with established market leaders,” Samsung Ventures Investment Corporation (SVIC) explained on Wednesday. “The company has demonstrated both a technical and business vision in driving adoption of OLED displays and lighting, and we look forward to contributing to the progress of Novaled” in the future.
While Novaled now counts Samsung as an actual shareholder – with both companies poised to benefit financially by doing business with one another – PANL failed to negotiate even a royalty-based agreement with Samsung like the one that it previously had. Meanwhile, some experts feel, the new relationship between Samsung and Novaled only further complicates the mystery already surrounding the altered arrangement between Samsung and PANL itself.
If nothing else, at least, this much appears to be clear: PANL will not be receiving any royalty payments from Samsung under its new contract, let alone the higher royalties that were apparently baked into its stock before the company actually inked that deal. In late spring, with PANL fetching around $56 a share, Canaccord Genuity estimated that the stock already reflected a future royalty rate of 2% -- more than double the assumed rate then received by the company -- under a new Samsung contract and therefore faced little opportunity for additional upside going forward.
“While we ultimately see a favorable agreement,” Canaccord stated when downgrading PANL from buy to hold this May, “we feel the current price is already pricing in the best-case scenario in not only the longer-term opportunity but a successful resolution to the Samsung negotiations” as well.
PANL plummeted a full $10 to $46 a share on the day that report appeared, hit not only by the sobering downgrade but also by the company’s weak financial results. Despite a dramatic increase in first-quarter sales, including a 159% jump in commercial revenue, PANL reported another multimillion-dollar loss – almost three times the size expected by Wall Street – that rattled a market normally accustomed to red ink from the company.
With PANL sinking toward $40 a share a few weeks later, Goldman Sachs stepped forward with a ringing endorsement of the company. As the lead manager of a big stock offering carried out by PANL two months earlier, records show, Goldman had joined together with its fellow underwriters to purchase a combined 575,000 shares of that newly issued stock at the below-market price of $46 a share. While those underwriters found themselves sitting on $10 million in paper gains just one week later, when PANL hit a record high above $63 a share, the stock soon began to reverse course and ultimately lost so much ground – falling below even the discounted offering price – that they wound up with sizable paper losses instead.
Goldman threw its powerful name behind PANL at that point, initiating coverage of the company with a buy recommendation and a $55 price target on the shares. As previously calculated by Canaccord and further verified by Goldman itself, that $55 price assumed that PANL would more than double the estimated royalty rate that it had been receiving from Samsung when the two parties finally inked a new long-term agreement.
In the meantime, however, even Goldman conceded that PANL looked rather pricey based upon traditional measures.
“Although valuation appears high on near-term numbers and expectations are fairly elevated, we think the fundamental outlook for Universal is strong, with our estimates biased to the upside, supporting our buy rating,” Goldman stated at the time. Meanwhile, “slower adoption of OLED displays, lower royalty rates and challenges to the company’s IP (intellectual property) are fundamental risks to the downside.”
One of those downside risks erupted into full-blown news just a few days later, when The Korea Times reported that a recent decision in Japan – invalidating all of the claims covered under two important OLED patents held by PANL – could allow Samsung to save “millions of dollars” in royalty payments going forward. PANL sank $3 to less than $38 a share on the day that news appeared, erasing the momentary lift provided by the most powerful firm on Wall Street, and went on to fall another $10 a share in the summer months that followed.
PANL finally staged its big comeback in late August, when the company announced the new Samsung contract and sparked an immediate celebration among Wall Street analysts and ordinary investors alike. For its part, Goldman quickly (but prematurely) predicted that PANL had negotiated higher royalty rates under a new contract that actually eliminated all royalty payments instead. Even after PANL spoiled this hopeful theory by releasing the official contract, however, Goldman maintained its bullish stand on the company and actually raised its price target on the stock – by a full $20 – to $65 a share.
But other firms took a more cautious approach, clearly bothered by the secretive treatment of that long-awaited deal. Although PANL had managed to hit $50 a share on hopeful speculation about that agreement, Oppenheimer wondered aloud just how long that rally could last.
“What is missing is additional detailed information,” Oppenheimer cautioned a few days after PANL released a heavily redacted version of the new contract, “which is necessary for the stock to hold onto its current gains, in our view.”
Meanwhile, Avondale soon followed up with a surprising revelation that hinted at the possibility of additional clues about that contract in the near term. Specifically, in a report issued on Aug. 31, Avondale indicated that regulators had taken notice of the vague contract and could soon take action – by forcing additional disclosures from the company – as well.
“Details of the agreements remain fuzzy,” Avondale noted at the time. But “the SEC will review the redacted version of the agreement within the next two to three weeks and could decide the terms are material and must be disclosed.
“Should the financial terms be below expectations,” Avondale added, “shares could be impacted” on the news.
While a full month has passed since Avondale announced that possible SEC review, however, PANL has released no additional information about its new Samsung agreement and has given no indication that it might face regulatory orders to do so. Unless that situation changes, critics emphasize, PANL investors could be forced to wait months for the company to actually report financial results that expose the true impact of that contract.
Meanwhile, as noted above, PANL insiders – including top executives with likely access to crucial information that ordinary shareholders lack – have already struck it rich by selling millions of dollars worth of stock ignited by high hopes for that top-secret deal.
By now, the leaders of PANL – including Chairman Sherwin Seligsohn, CEO Steven Abramson and CFO Sidney Rosenblatt -- have already stained their records with one notable failure in the technology space.
Before that trio launched PANL, records show, they spent years running another company – originally known as International Mobile Machines (IMM) – that looked like a hopeless disaster throughout their reign and much of the decade that followed. PANL has embraced the same kind of business model originally adopted by IMM, records indicate, which banked its future on patented technology that could potentially lead to lucrative royalty-based partnership deals.
IMM had spent years operating in the red by the time it inked a celebrated agreement with BellSouth in the fall of 1988, an old Barron’s article reveals, which promised to finally reverse the fortunes of the struggling company. At that point, Barron’s noted, IMM had already seen its market value soar -- topping 65 times its prior-year sales – based on mere hopes that the new contract could finally transform the company into a profitable success.
“The enthusiasm of IMM’s rooting section on the Street is reflected in the high market evaluation of its shares,” Barron’s observed at the time. “However, there are some strenuous naysayers … IMM last month had the dubious honor of being the third most-shorted OTC issue.”
IMM continued to bleed despite the announcement of other promising contracts, the Philadelphia Business Journal reported in mid-1990, with the stock spiraling from a 52-week high above $10 a share to as low as one-third of that peak price. By then, under the direction of its original leaders (who would soon begin to distance themselves from the troubled company), IMM had reportedly sullied its reputation on Wall Street as well.
IMM officials have “a long history of touting their own stock,” Raymond James analyst John Bain told the Philadelphia Business Journal at the time. And “that hurts their credibility.”
Like PANL, records show, IMM counted its extensive patents as its primary asset. For his part, however, Bain portrayed those patents as almost useless in a high-tech arena dominated by powerful giants that would not allow a small company like IMM to push them around. To expect otherwise, he indicated, would be a futile exercise in “wishful thinking” at best.
By the end of the following year, records show, the trio of original IMM leaders who would later run PANL had all resigned and left behind a company facing a decade of remarkable turmoil. IMM reinvented itself as InterDigital (Nasdaq: IDCC) in 1992, records show, and then hired a series of CEOs – including one later sanctioned by regulators for allegedly violating insider trading laws – in a frustrating hunt for stability and success. After trying out several different candidates (all of them short-lived), Pennsylvania magazine noted back in 2000, IDCC actually gave up for a while and spent almost three years operating without a CEO at all.
The company finally filled that long-vacant post in April of 2000, the magazine reported, when it hired an industry veteran away from giant Motorola (NYSE: MMI) – which had prevailed over IDCC in a fierce patent war – to become its new turnaround CEO. When he first accepted that challenging position, the magazine revealed, Mark Gercenstein sparked a fresh wave of hope for the company and its wildly volatile tech stock.
“Gercenstein arrives at a time of intense interest in wireless technologies and after a tumultuous decade for the small technology company,” the magazine observed at the time. “His mission at InterDigital includes cultivating better relationships with Wall Street – no analysts currently cover the company – as well as growing the company and adding management and technical depth.”
But IDCC abruptly decided to replace Gercenstein just seven months later, the Philadelphia Business Journal reported, alarming investors and hammering its stock price with the inexplicable move. Only then did IDCC finally appoint a lasting chief who, together with his successor (current CEO William Merritt), transformed the company into the success that it is today.
Although PANL leaders may like to cite their past experience at IDCC as solid evidence of their own success, critics remind, the company never turned a profit while they were in charge and continued to struggle long after they had already left.
Once they abandoned IMM, records show, that same trio wasted little time before launching the technology company that they oversee right now. Within five years, records indicate, they had taken PANL public as a small-cap stock on the Nasdaq exchange and – together with former IMM consultant Dean Ledger – initially served as the only executives and directors of the brand-new company.
After upgrading to the Nasdaq National Market stock exchange in September of 2000, records show, PANL soon began to appoint some of the more notable directors who now serve on the company’s board. First, just weeks after that move to the larger Nasdaq exchange, PANL welcomed C. Keith Hartley into its boardroom and placed him on both its audit and its compensation committees as well.
Hartley had previously spent 17 years working as a managing partner in the corporate finance department at Drexel Burnham Lambert, The Washington Post noted in the past, the notorious firm (which counted IMM as a past client) where Michael Milken made his name as the so-called “junk bond king” before his conviction on fraud-related charges. When PANL tapped him as a new director, records show, Hartley already filled a boardroom seat at Comdisco – another technology company – that had recently placed the founder’s daring young son, Nicholas Pontikas, in charge and would soon pay a high price for his poorly supervised activities.
“Mr. Pontikes, with the blessing of Comdisco’s board of directors, made one big bet after another on just about every risky new economy role he could find,” Crain’s Chicago Business reported after the once-profitable company imploded the following year. “He convinced the board that the new economy was speeding by, and Comdisco needed to catch up – fast. (And) nobody put on the brakes.”
In just two short years, the newspaper marveled in late 2001, young Pontikes had managed to effectively destroy a solid company that had taken his father an entire quarter-of-a-century to build. That breathtaking collapse actually made history, the newspaper revealed, with Comdisco filing one of the biggest bankruptcy cases on record at that time.
By then, PANL had appointed another new director to serve on its own board as well. Leonard Becker began his long tenure as a PANL director in January of 2001, records show, shortly after Ledger – who still handles publicity for the company – ended his service as an early director (appointed before PANL even went public) and opened up a seat.
Like Hartley, records show, Becker arrived at PANL as the director of another public company that would later suffer a disastrous fate. He served on the board at American Business Financial Services (ABFS), Dow Jones has reported in the past, a subprime mortgage lender that went bankrupt in 2005 after allegedly concealing massive losses from the public for years. Angry investors blamed ABFS officers and directors (including Becker himself) for that failure, Dow Jones noted, suing them – for alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, mismanagement and negligence – after their stock turned into worthless pieces of paper.
Like Hartley, records show, Becker also fills dual roles at PANL – as a member of both its audit and its compensation committees – that serve two critical, but vastly different, purposes. On the one hand, PANL has assigned the pair important responsibilities by relying on them to verify the accuracy of the financial statements used by investors to evaluate the company. On the other hand, however, PANL has also afforded them opportunistic powers by allowing them to establish compensation packages for the very insiders who awarded them their lucrative board seats in the first place.
They responded to the latter call in dramatic fashion last year, records indicate, by approving the most generous compensation packages (by far) that the company’s top executives had ever seen. For starters, records show, they established a brand-new retirement plan that will allow any officer who works at PANL for at least 15 years and remains at the company through traditional retirement age to keep on collecting a valuable chunk of his base salary for as long as he (or his spouse) happens to live.
The CEO and CFO have by now already completed 14 of those 15 years of service, records show, with the first set to reach 65 in just six years and the second poised to hit that same magical age well before that. As a result, PANL set aside more than $5.3 million last year just to prepare for those future paychecks.
Thanks to that new retirement plan and multimillion-dollar stock awards, records show, the CEO saw his total compensation package balloon to $6.36 million (from $1.19 million previously) last year. Because the CFO will hit retirement age earlier, qualifying for those lifetime benefits in just two short years, his compensation package swelled to an even larger $7.68 million (up from $1.94 million in 2009) during that same period.
All told, records show, the CEO and CFO received compensation packages worth $14 million – a sum equal to almost half the revenue that PANL generated throughout 2010 – for the very year when the company’s most important contract expired. The board tried to justify those handsome payouts by included PANL in a peer group crowded with profitable companies, records show, even though PANL – despite its losses – still spent more on its top executives than three-quarters of those other firms did.
The CEO further boosted his big paycheck by selling about $1 million worth of stock last year, records show, with the CFO pocketing even fatter profits on his own stock sales in that same period. They have gone on to collect another $5 million, more than half of that last month, in stock proceeds since that time.
Since 2005 (the year that PANL landed its original contract with Samsung), records show, insiders have sold $30 million worth of stock in the company. Notably, records indicate, they collected roughly $20 million – or two-thirds of that total – during the brief, but critical, 15-month period after the company’s original contract with Samsung first expired.
To critics, that striking pattern speaks volumes about the top-secret contract that PANL seems so reluctant to openly discuss. While PANL insiders limited their stock sales when the company’s relationship with Samsung still felt young and promising, critics say, they dramatically increased their profit-taking as the magic seemed to fade.
Manuel Asensio, cofounder of the organization that provided regulators with a detailed comparison of the original Samsung agreement and the mysterious contract that replaced it, feels confident that the honeymoon for those two parties has obviously ended.
“They got married in 2005,” reminds Asensio, who says that neither he nor his organization holds a short position in PANL’s stock. “This was not a celebration of the vows.
“No,” he concludes, “this was more like a divorce.”
* Important Disclosure: Prior to the publication of this article, TheStreetSweeper (through its members) established a short position in PANL with the intention of profiting on declines in the share price. Since Sept. 27, TheStreetSweeper has sold a total of 51,638 shares of PANL stock short at an average price of $49.95 a share. It covered 26,638 of those shares on Oct. 3 at $43.01 a share and an additional 20,800 shares on Oct. 4 at $41.88 a share. It covered the remaining 4,200 shares on Oct. 5 at 43.81 a share. Going forward, TheStreetSweeper may choose to establish a new short position in PANL and will fully disclose the details of any future transactions in the stock as those trades occur.
* Update: TheStreetSweeper began establishing a new short position in PANL on Oct. 11, when it sold 1,138 shares of the company's stock short at $47.21 a share. It sold an additional 4,600 shares of PANL short on Oct. 14 at $50.60 a share and covered the same number of shares on Oct. 17 at $49.60 a share. It covered its original 1,138 shares of PANL, at a price of $47.59 a share, on Oct. 17 as well. TheStreetSweeper then sold another 4,600 shares of PANL short on Oct. 18 at $49.88 a share and covered that position at $49.37 on the following day. It sold an addition 8,200 shares of PANL at $51.85 on Oct. 14, which it covered at $49.37 on Oct. 14, and no longer has a position in the stock.
* Update: TheStreetSweeper started another new short position in PANL on Oct. 28, when it sold 5,000 shares of the company's stock short at $49.55 a share. It covered that position the same day at $48.82 a share. TheStreetSweeper then established a larger short position in PANL on Nov. 4, when it sold 21,000 shares of the stock short at $49.79 a share. It covered that position on Nov. 7 at $48.42 a share. It established another short position in PANL on Nov. 8, when it sold 3,960 shares of the company's stock short at $49.49 a share. It sold another 6,000 shares of PANL short on Nov. 11 at $52.48 a share and an additional 15,900 shares of the stock short on Nov. 15 at $52.14 a share As a result, TheStreetSweeper has currently sold a total of 25,860 shares of PANL short at an average price of $51.81 a share. TheStreetSweeper covered that position on Nov. 17, when it repurchased all 25,860 shares at an average price of $50.77 a share.
* Update: TheStreetSweeper established a new short position in PANL on Dec. 5, when it sold 13,900 shares of the company's stock short at $42.36 a share. TheStreetSweeper sold another 11,126 shares of PANL short on Dec. 6 at $41.81 a share and an additional 12,752 shares on Dec. 7 at $41.85 a share. It also sold 2,800 shares of PANL short on Dec. 8 at $41.33 a share, but then proceeded to cover an equal number of shares at $38.98 on the same day. TheStreetSweeper further increased its short position in PANL on Dec. 9, when it sold another 26,400 shares of the stock short at $40.48 a share, and has now sold a total of 69,178 shares of the stock short at an average price of $41.35 a share.
* Update: TheStreetSweeper covered 42,679 shares of PANL on Dec. 13 at $37 a share. It covered the remaining 12,521 shares of PANL on Dec. 14 at $34.73 a share and no longer has a position in the stock at this time. Going forward, TheStreetSweeper may choose to establish a new short position in PANL and will fully disclose the details of any future transactions in the stock as those trades occur.
As a matter of policy, TheStreetSweeper prohibits members of its editorial team from taking financial positions in any of the companies that they cover. To contact Melissa Davis, the editor of this website and the author of this story, please send an email to firstname.lastname@example.org.